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Abstract: Rural areas across the U.S. have struggled since the Great Recession, with 
limited employment growth and significant outmigration. Many public- and private-
sector programs are focused on generating economic development in rural areas, but few 
are formally evaluated. One often-overlooked component required for effective rural 
development is the generation of local sales tax revenue, which helps fund city amenities 
and services. This research evaluates how one specific rural development public-sector 
program – the USDA’s B&I Loan Guarantee program – impacts sales tax revenue for 
recipient Oklahoma communities. Sales tax revenue and census demographic data for all 
Oklahoma communities that charged a sales tax between 2005 and 2015 is meshed with 
information on B&I loan recipient communities during that time. Multivariate regression 
and coarsened exact matching (CEM) techniques are used to assess the impacts on sales 
tax revenues across all 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) retail codes. 
Propensity score matching is also used for a robustness check of the CEM results. The 
results from the regression models depict mixed results of the impact that the B&I 
program has on total retail sales (TRS) and TRS per capita in Oklahoma. During time 
period one (2005-2010), the regression coefficient for the loan amount variable were 
positive and statistically significant across all models except one. Time period two (2010-
2015) results show little to no significant impact of B&I loans on TRS and TRS per 
capita. The economic environment during these two periods were dramatically different, 
with the Great Recession occurring during time one and a major oil boom in time two. 
The results demonstrate that the B&I program and other similar programs may be more 
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While most (97%) of the United States’ land mass is defined as rural, only 19.3% of the total 
population resided there as of 2010 (US Census Bureau, 2017). This is significantly smaller than 
the 54.4% of the US population living in rural areas in 1910 (Ratcliffe et al., 2016). This trend of 
population decline in rural areas is a result of the growth of urban areas over the past century. 
Urban and rural areas also differ in levels of – and growth in – employment. Since the 2008-2009 
recession the unemployment rate has declined in both geographic areas, but employment growth 
has been significantly slower in rural locations (Cromartie, 2018). The slower rate of recovery in 
many rural areas stems from a variety of sources, including a slowdown in traditionally rural-
dominated industries such as manufacturing, and lower levels of amenities to attract new 
residents or businesses.  
The need for more economic development in rural areas has been recognized by both the 
private and public sectors, with many programs devoted to promoting growth in rural economies 
(Johnson, 2009). However, there is a limited amount of literature evaluating these programs to 
assess their effectiveness. Most evaluations that do take place are performed by the agencies that 
administer the programs or by outside evaluators that may not conduct a thorough analysis. Bartik 
and Bingham (1997) discuss six reasons why rigorous program evaluations are not typically done, 
including that more complex studies are difficult to do and are usually more costly. These
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complex analyses not only increase budgetary costs but also require time from administrators and 
staff to design and implement the collection of data needed for the study. However, Bartik and 
Bingham (1997) argue that the main reason rigorous evaluations are not performed is that if the 
outcome is not favorable, the program administrators may face negative political consequences. 
This results in the need for program evaluations done by researchers without any ties to the 
agency, using a thorough and well-thought-out methodology as opposed to some of the “in-
house” evaluations that often take place (for example, surveying program beneficiaries or 
summarizing program statistical data). Such surveys or simple descriptive statistics can be easier 
to manipulate, whereas a more robust analysis that considers the program’s true impact on 
specific economic outcomes will be more useful to policymakers (Bartik and Bingham, 1997).  
One of the public programs devoted to the economic development of rural America is the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Rural Development (RD) Rural Business-
Cooperative Services (RBS). The purpose statement of RBS is to “provide loans, loan guarantees, 
grants, and payments designed to increase economic opportunity in rural America” (Office of 
Budget and Program Analysis, 2018). The RBS program with the largest amount of funding is the 
Business and Industry (B&I) Loan Guarantee program with nearly $1 billion worth of funds 
designated to it every fiscal year (FY). Table 1 shows the proposed budgets for the major 
programs of RBS since 2012, and demonstrates the dominance of the B&I program within this 
line of funding. In the first budget proposals by the president for FY 2018 and FY 2019, the 
funding for almost all RBS programs were eliminated (shown in Table 1). However, these 
proposals to cut the funding of RBS programs did not stand, and were later funded in the enacted 
budgets1 – likely due to a backlash from both the public and private sectors. One example of the 
backlash is a letter prepared by the ranking Democratic member of the House Committee on 
Small Business (Velazquez, 2018). This letter explained how eliminating the B&I program would 
 
1 The enacted budget amounts are located in Appendix I 
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significantly cut the loan pool for rural businesses and their communities. This letter also argued 
that small businesses are the foundation for the U.S. economy, and that they need an environment 
that will allow them to continue to grow and succeed. Removing all funding from the program 
would make it more difficult for such businesses to operate in a stable environment and would 
present them with even more challenges than they already face. She further argued that the lower 
funding specifically for the B&I program would lead to lower economic growth, higher 
unemployment rates, and population loss in rural areas (Velazquez, 2018).  
Table 1 
USDA Rural Business-Cooperative Service Programs Proposed Budget Level of Funding 
(in millions of dollars) 
Item 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Appropriate Tech. 
Transfer to Rural Areas 
- - $2 $2 $2 $2 - - - 
Bioenergy for Advanced 
Biofuels 
$105 a/ a/ $15 $15 $15 $15 - $7 
Biorefinery Assistance 
Guaranteed Loans 
- a/ a/ $124 $254 - - - - 
Business and Industry 
Guaranteed Loans 
$823 $821 $741 $591 $758 $892 - - $1,000 
Intermediary Relending 
Program 
$36 $19 $19 $10 $10 $19 - - - 
Rural Business 
Development Grants 
$37 $30 $0 $58 $30 $30 - - - 
Rural Cooperative 
Development Grants 
$16 $13 $55 $0 $6 $6 - - - 
Rural Economic 
Development: Loans and 
Grants 
$43 $43 $43 $69 $97 $97 - - - 
Rural Energy for 
America (Sec. 9007) 
Loans and Grants 
$211 $19 $52 $313 $485 $450 $423 $515 $370 
Rural Microentrepreneur 
Assistance Program (sec. 
6022): Loans and Grants 




- - - $3 $3 $3 - - - 
Value-Added Producer 
Grants 
$20 $15 $15 $11 $10 $11 - - - 
a/ - subject to 
reauthorization          
These are all proposed budget amounts and not the estimated or enacted amounts 





However, the B&I loan program was reestablished in the proposed 2020 USDA budget, 
demonstrating that the program has political support again. In fact, the 2020 proposal was 
increased by $80 million from the FY 2019 enacted amount ($920 million) to $1 billion dollars. 
This level of funding is expected to assist 433 businesses and create or save roughly 11,000 jobs, 
which is estimated in the 2020 USDA Budget explanatory notes2. The details of the 2020 USDA 
budget proposal are interesting: It proposes rescinding the mandatory funds provided in the 2018 
Farm Bill and the elimination of all other discretionary RBS programs (Table 1). Therefore, while 
the B&I loan guarantee program currently has significant support and funding, a rigorous 
program evaluation is needed to document the degree to which it is linked to economic 
development in rural America. This leaves the door open for future research to investigate the 
importance of the other RBS programs that were not funded in the 2020 USDA budget. 
One important component of rural economic development is the fiscal situation of local 
governments (i.e. city/county). In the public finance literature, there is a section focusing on “tax 
adequacy” for state and local governments (Berney and Larson, 1968; Fox, 1986; Alm, 1996; 
Nelson et al., 2007). The concept of tax adequacy focuses on the governments’ ability to provide 
a consistent level of public services for their constituents, even in economic downturns (Mikesell, 
1984; Fox, 1986). Reducing the variability of revenue received is an important part of this idea. 
Tax revenue is one of the main income sources for governmental revenue, but it is especially vital 
for local governments. In 2016, roughly 40 percent of local revenue came from property, sales 
and other taxes (Tax Policy Center, n.d.). A large portion of the other local revenue comes from 
intergovernmental transfers, with a historical average of roughly 45 percent in rural areas (Felix 
and Henderson, 2010). However, during the most recent recession, revenue from 
intergovernmental transfers from state government shrunk, suggesting that local tax revenue is 
 
2 The expected numbers are estimated based on the amount of funding levels, how many businesses were 
assisted, and from the number of jobs created in previous years.  
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even more vital for rural America (Felix and Henderson, 2010). If intergovernmental funding is 
cut by the state government, there is a need to offset the cuts to prevent budget shortfalls in local 
governments. Property taxes in nonmetropolitan counties remained relatively strong during the 
economic downturn because of the stable nature of rural real estate, but there is still a need to find 
more avenues of revenue to support the local government (Felix and Henderson, 2010).  
Several studies from the finance literature have examined income versus sales tax 
revenue in terms of tax adequacy, and their resulting impacts on economic growth. Holcombe and 
Sobel (1995) and Sobel and Wagner (2003) examined the cyclical variability of the state income 
and sales taxes using data from two distinct periods. State revenue data from 1949 to 1989 was 
used in Holcombe and Sobel (1995), while Sobel and Wagner (2003) used 2001 state revenue 
data. Both articles found that sales tax revenues are more consistent over time compared to 
income tax, and are therefore very important to the state’s tax adequacy. Helms (1985) examined 
how state and local tax rate increases affected economic growth when the revenue is used in 
different ways. His state-level results from pooled time series and cross-sectional data showed 
that funding transfer payments significantly slowed economic growth. However, if the revenue is 
used to fund public services, the enhanced services may more than counterbalance the 
disincentive effects of the associated taxes (Helms, 1985). Thus, increasing local tax revenue (and 
using it appropriately) is an important component of economic growth. 
Even though increasing tax revenue is not a listed goal or objective for any specific 
USDA RD program, a different, but still important avenue of research is to examine whether the 
B&I program expands total retail sales, which helps support local governments3. The Holcombe 
and Sobel (1995) and Sobel and Wagner (2003) articles demonstrate the importance of sales taxes 
 
3 The goal of the B&I program is to promote the creation of rural businesses to secure start-up capital, 
finance business expansion, and create jobs. B&I also improves the quality of life for residents, and it helps 
economic development in rural areas. These goals support the USDA strategic goal 4. (Office of Budget 
and Program Analysis, 2019)  
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for reducing the variability in state budgets. However, little analysis has focused on the impacts 
of specific economic developments programs to local tax coffers. 
This research will evaluate the B&I Loan Guarantee program by using multivariate 
regression to examine tax revenue changes in Oklahoma communities after receiving a B&I loan 
guarantee. The dataset is pruned using coarsened exact matching to ensure appropriate 
comparisons between treated and control groups.  A logical hypothesis is that an increase in tax 
revenue will be observed, but to my knowledge no formal evaluation of this type has taken place 
on this or other similar programs. This research aims to address this void in the literature. As a 
robustness check on the results, propensity score matching is also used to match communities 






REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Background Information 
The B&I loan guarantee program is currently administered by RD’s Business and Cooperative 
Programs. However, the B&I loan program was created before RD was even established. B&I 
was organized under the Farmers Home Administration, a former program of the USDA, in 1972 
by the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act (Cowan, 2016). The Rural Development 
Agency was later conceived by the Agricultural Reorganization Act of 1994, which established 
the three current sectors of RD: Rural Business-Cooperative Service (RBS), Rural Housing 
Service (RHS), and Rural-Utilities Services (RUS) (Cowan, 2016).  
In the early years of RBS, direct loan funding was available, but since fiscal year 2002 
there has been no funding for direct loans. This has resulted in the B&I program consisting of 
loan guarantees only (Cowan, 2016). Since there are no more direct loans available, only lenders 
with sufficient experience, the legal lending authority, and financial strength to operate a 
successful loan program can apply for loan guarantees. These lenders include federal or state-
charted banks, savings and loans, farm credit banks, and credit unions (Rural Development, 
2017). The amount of guarantee on the loan depends on the size of the loan. Loans of $5 million 
or less are guaranteed up to 80%, a 70% loan guarantee is offered for loans between $5 million 
and $10 million, and loans exceeding $10 million to $25 million receive a maximum of a 60% 
guarantee (Rural Development, 2017). The limit for most loan guarantees is $10 million but the
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administrator of RBS can grant loan guarantees up to $25 million at his or her discretion (Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, 2018). The typical loan guarantee size was roughly $3.5 
million for FY 17 for the US and was roughly around $3.7 million for Oklahoma (Oehler and 
Lewis, 2017; Wiles4, 2019). Some of the industries receiving loan guarantees in Oklahoma are 
manufacturing, construction, oil and gas companies, convenience stores, restaurants, and medical 
services, which are all high-risk industries but are important to improve economic development5.  
Proponents of the B&I program argue it is vital because locally owned banks are 
struggling in rural communities, and many do not have abundant resources to fund significant 
investments in economic development projects. A recent analysis shows that rural locations 
comprise only 10% of all small loans to businesses, and that over 30% of rural counties do not 
have a local bank as of 2017 (up from only 13% in 1995) (Ensign and Jones, 2019).  
Lenders use the B&I program to increase lending capacity, because most rural banks do 
not have ample amounts of capital to loan large amounts of money to one business. There is also 
significant risk involved with loaning large amounts of money to just one borrower because of the 
default rates of small businesses. The rate of small businesses that survived their first year from 
2005 to 2017 was roughly 79%, but this number falls off to roughly 50% for survival to five years 
or longer, and only about one-third of businesses survive 10 years or longer (Office of Advocacy, 
2018). A report from Voight and Campbell (2017) found that roughly one of six loans from the 
Small Business Association (SBA) defaulted between 2006 and 2015. An analysis by Tetreault 
(2019) found a similar percentage for the average default rate of SBA loans in Oklahoma from 
2010 to 2018 (13.3%). The B&I program aims to reduce the risk for a bank lending to business in 
rural areas. The delinquency rate for B&I was roughly three to 10 percent from 2000 to 2017, 
notably lower than those from SBA loans (Johnson, 2009; Oehler and Lewis, 2017). The B&I 
 
4 Brian Wiles is the Program Director for RBS in the state of Oklahoma. 
5 These examples of industries come from the dataset provided by the Oklahoma RD state office. 
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program also aims to reduce the failure rates of businesses as well. Rupasingha, Crown, and 
Pender’s (2019) analysis found that 0.30 of 1000 businesses are predicted to fail two years after 
receiving a B&I loan, while non-recipient businesses with similar characteristics have a predicted 
failure rate of approximately 3 per 1000 businesses.  
One important caveat when discussing rural development efforts is how “rural” is 
defined. RD’s definition for “rural areas” is somewhat different from the definitions used by other 
governmental offices. RD defines the eligible areas for the B&I program as any town or city with 
a population of 50,000 or less (Rural Development, 2017). 6 This differs from the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s traditional definition of “rural” as a city with population less than 2,500. As the USDA 
Economic Research Service explains, there are multiple ways to define a rural community 
(Ratcliffe et. al, 2016). The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines metropolitan areas 
as central counties with one or more urbanized areas densely-settled urban entities with 50,000 or 
more people, as compared to the city level definition of the census and RD. OMB also includes 
outlying counties economically tied to core counties that have 25% of workers living in the 
county commuting to the central counties, or where 25% of the employment comes from the 
central counties, as metropolitan. Nonmetro counties are located outside the boundaries of the 
metro areas (Cromartie and Parker, 2019). Government programs use alternative definitions of 
“rural” or “nonmetropolitan” to designate entities that are eligible for funding (Cromartie and 
Bucholtz, 2008). 
Literature Review 
There is a limited amount of literature focusing on evaluating the B&I loan guarantee program, 
but there have been several studies assessing other USDA and federal economic development 
 
6 RD also allow the borrower’s headquarters may be in a larger city as long as the project location is located 
in an eligible area. The lender can be located anywhere, and some projects may be funded in rural and 




efforts. One of the more recent studies of an RD program is Rupasingha, Pender, and Wiggins’ 
(2018) evaluation of the Value-Added Producer Grant Program (VAPG). Rupasingha et al. 
(2018) used survival analysis to document that businesses receiving a VAPG between 2001 and 
2013 were less likely to fail, and that the likelihood of the failure decreased as the amount of the 
VAPG increased. This same study also used multivariate regression analysis to see if the VAPG 
affects employment growth and found that businesses receiving a VAPG employed on average 
five more workers than nonrecipients in the same period. This increase in employment was 
substantial since a participating business on average only employed 14 workers at the time of the 
grant (Rupasingha et al., 2018). Another study, by Janeski and Whitacre (2009), examined the 
short- and long-term impact of RD’s Water and Sewer Infrastructure Program. They used 
multivariate regression and average treatment effects on different economic growth measures 
between Oklahoma communities that received/did not receive funding. In their analysis, they 
found no evidence of any short-term (less than 10 years) impacts, but in the long term (10 to 20 
years) median house values were notably higher (between five and 13 percentage points) in the 
recipient communities (Janeski and Whitacre, 2009). A third study, by Conley and Whitacre 
(2019), evaluated the Community Development Block Grant program (CDBG) using similar 
evaluation techniques and focused on similar economic growth measures as Janeski and Whitacre 
(2009). However, the evaluation found that rural Oklahoma communities receiving a CDBG did 
not have a higher level of economic growth over the short and long run compared to similar 
communities that did not receive funding (Conley and Whitacre 2019). 
One study of a non-USDA program is Whitacre, Shideler, and Williams’ (2016) 
evaluation of Oklahoma’s Quality Jobs program, which used similar techniques as the previous 
studies mentioned. The results from their study revealed there was no evidence that Oklahoma 
communities participating in the Quality Jobs program had economic growth compared to 
Oklahoma communities not participating the in program (Whitacre, Shideler, and Williams 
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2016). However, when comparing Oklahoma communities participating in the program to Kansas 
communities (where no Quality Jobs program exists) there was statistical evidence of median 
household income growth (Whitacre, Shideler, and Williams 2016). Another non-USDA program 
evaluation study is Rupasingha and Wang’s (2017) analysis of the Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA) small business loans. The CRA seeks to address the limited amount of capital available to 
minority and low-income neighborhoods as well as to small businesses and farms (Rupasingha 
and Wang, 2017). Rupasingha and Wang (2017) found that at the county level, the lending 
practices of CRA loans have a positive effect on small business growth (in terms of number of 
establishments). They used data from a panel of 3050 counties over the period of 1996 – 20107.  
Hansen and Kalambokidis (2010) assessed the impact of the Job Opportunity Building 
Zone (JOBZ), a tax-free-zone economic development program, in Minnesota. The main goals of 
JOBZ were to increase new investments and job creation in the zones designated by the program. 
In their assessment, Hansen and Kalambokidis (2010) determined at the county level there was 
little evidence of economic growth during the first three years of the program, but there was 
significant evidence of positive job creation.  
These articles generally demonstrated that the programs evaluated had some type of 
positive result. However, several articles with various types of econometric analysis have found 
little to no positive impact from other types of government programs. Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz 
(1995) explored the existence of productivity spillovers from the state highway system, because it 
is implied that public infrastructure is linked to large productivity effects from public spending. 
They found no evidence of increased spillover productivity, despite the fact of the highway 
systems are designed to have interstate linkages. Evans and Karras (1994) used panel data from 
 
7 Rupasingha and Wang (2017) used county level data instead of individual business level data because 
they did not have access to individual borrower data. Also, they did not use employment numbers as their 
dependent variable because the employment data are withheld to avoid disclosing data of individual 
companies; instead, they used establishment data as the dependent variable.   
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the lower 48 states to determine to what extent government capital and services positively impact 
private production. In their results, there was only significant evidence for governmental 
education services being productive, and no findings of productivity related to other 
governmental activities and services (such as highway, sewer and sanitation, and police and fire 
services). Thus, not all academic research supports the hypothesis that government program 
expenditures are effective tools for economic development.  
A program with similar characteristics as the B&I is the SBA’s 7(a) and 504 loan 
programs, which was evaluated by Craig, Jackson III, and Thomson (2007).8 In their analysis, 
Craig et al. (2007) used a panel data set with approximately 2,200 local market observations, and 
found a small positive relationship between the level of SBA-guaranteed lending in a local 
banking market and future per capita income growth. However, the results do not necessarily 
document a causal relationship because Craig et al. (2007) do not know if the SBA loan guarantee 
program is directly contributing to growth or if the programs are just acting as a proxy for small 
business lending. 
To my knowledge, there have only been two studies that focused on the B&I program 
specifically. The first study was Johnson (2009), who focused solely on the impact of the 
program on county employment for loans obligated from 1986 to 2003. The analysis found 
through ordinary least squares regression and propensity score matching that there was an 
increase in employment of 3% to 6% in county employment-per-capita, and a 3% to 5% decrease 
in county earnings-per-worker growth over the two years immediately following the loan 
(Johnson, 2009). Thus, the program seemed to increase jobs, but also resulted in lower average 
earnings – and as such the effects on total county earnings was indeterminate. The most recent 
 
8 Both the 7(a) and 504 loan guarantee programs, but their maximum amount to guarantee is $1,000,000 
and $1,300,000 respectively. Both programs can fund businesses in rural and metro areas, unlike the B&I, 
which only lends to businesses in rural areas. 
13 
 
study by Rupasingha, Crown, and Pender (2018) used similar economic analysis techniques as 
previous studies in this area. One unique feature of Rupasingha, Crown, and Pender’s (2018) 
research is their linking of the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) data to the B&I 
program administrative data to create a database of 4,361 B&I recipient business between 1990-
2003. The NETS database is not openly accessible to the public, but its inclusion of individual 
businesses allows for a more pointed analysis. Rupasingha, Crown, and Pender (2018) found 
significant evidence that a business receiving a loan survived longer and created more jobs than 
non-recipient businesses. They also found that increasing the size of the loan decreased the risk of 
failure. However, there was no significant impact on business employment growth from 
increasing the size of the loan (Rupasingha, Crown, and Pender, 2018).  
Both previous B&I studies focus on job and economic growth at the county and business 
level, but they do not evaluate the impact the program had on tax revenue of a community. Both 
studies also use older (pre-2008) data on the B&I program, whereas this paper uses data from 
2005-2015. Tax revenue is vital for rural America as noted in the previous discussion of tax 
adequacy. A study by Walzer, Blanke, and Evans (2018) discussed the factors affecting retail 
sales in Illinois non-metro cities with population below 50,000 people, and offered five 
suggestions of how to build or revive the commercial areas. Walzer et al. (2018) also argued that 
taxes to generate revenue for local services are crucial for stabilizing populations in areas where 
outmigration is a common occurrence.  
A scan of the relevant literature suggests there are very few studies that focus directly on 
tax revenues associated with specific programs. Of the two studies found, both analyzed the 
Small Business Development Center (SBDC) counseling activities and the performance 
improvements of long-term clients, which should hypothetically result in a generation of 
incremental tax revenue increase. The most recent article is the Chrisman (2017), which appears 
to be an updated study of Chrisman and Katrishen (1994). The two articles used the same 
14 
 
methodologic approaches in their analysis – however, it should be noted that they are not 
regression-based. The approach was to calculate a weighted average of each tax figure based on 
the proportion of clients served by each state to the total clients served by the SBDC, and 
assumptions about how the jobs and sales supported by their program impacted local tax revenues 
(Chrisman, 2017; Chrisman and Katrishen 1994). Both of the articles took necessary steps to 
ensure the respondents were representative of the population. Notably, the articles also examined 
other economic impacts, such as jobs and sales, and estimated that the SBDC program increased 
sales and jobs during both times analyzed.  
Chrisman and Katrishen (1994) found that the performance improvements generated 
roughly $2.61 in incremental tax revenue for every dollar expended on the entire SBDC program 
in the US. Chrisman (2017) found that approximately $2.42 of tax revenue was generated from 
every dollar spent on SBDC programming. However, these results should be taken with caution 
because they are only estimates based on responses to a questionnaire from SBDC clients and did 









DATA AND MATERIALS 
DATA  
The data used in this paper is obtained at the place level, as designated by the US Census Bureau, 
for the state of Oklahoma. The US Census Bureau explains that a place is any area representing 
officially incorporated governments such as cities, towns, villages, municipality, township, 
community, populated place, neighborhood, postal place/zip code, populated place, or boroughs 
(Census Reporter, N.D., and Ratcliffe, N.D.). The number of places in a state can vary over time 
as new cities arise or some places are annexed into others. However, the analysis only focuses on 
Oklahoma places consistently listed by the Census between 2000 and 2015. 
US Census Bureau’s American Factfinder website was used to obtain all of the 
demographic characteristics of all places in Oklahoma for 2005, 2010, and 2015. In order to get 
the 2005 demographic characteristics, a linear approximation was used to get the average of the 
2000 and 2010 official census numbers. The official count from the census was used for the 2010 
data, and the American Community Survey (ACS) 2013-2017 five year estimates were used to 
produce the 2015 data from American Factfinder.  
One challenge of working with this data is the inconsistency in the number of places 
recorded from year to year. In 2005 there were 689 total places in Oklahoma; this increased to 
730 in 2010 and moved up to 743 in 2015. We break these places into five different size 
categories in Tables 2, 3 and 4. The number of places in each size category varies over time. 
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This variation could be because new places sprung up, some may have been annexed into other 
towns, and some places were dissolved. The population in the places also fluctuates up and down 
over the years, which results in some of the towns moving from one size category to another.  
The main variable of interest is the location and amount of the B&I loan guarantees 
issued, which the Oklahoma Rural Development state office graciously provided. During 2005 to 
2015 there were a total of 114 loan guarantees issued – 55 of which were issued during the 2005 
to 2009 time period and 59 that took place between 2010 and 2014. Figures 1 and 2 show the 
population size and the amount of the loan received of the loan recipient, respectively. However, 
one issue with the figures is that some places received multiple loans in one or both time periods. 
During time period one (2005-2009), only 40 different places in Oklahoma received the 55 loans 
issued, and only 37 different places received the 59 loans made during time period two (2010-
2014); this is shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4. The loan data used in the Tables 3 and 4 are the same 
(loans made during 2010-2014), but the distribution of the loans by size categories are different9.  
The 2,500 – 9,999 size category received the most loans with 21 loans for each time 
period, and the < 500 category received the least with only one loan in the 2010-2014 period. 
Table 2, 3, and 4 show some basic descriptive statistics for Oklahoma places in 2005, 2010, and 
2015, broken out by whether or not they received a loan during the 2005 – 2009 or 2010 – 2014 
period. The average population is higher in both 2005 and 2010 for towns that received a loan 
(versus nonrecipients), but not all of the averages are statistically different (Table 2 and 3). 
However, in Table 4 when the 2015 population is used, the average population with loans is 
lower than the population without loans in the 500-2,499 category, but the rest of the size 
categories have similar results as Tables 2 and 3. Furthermore, population is higher and 
 
9 The distributions of the loans by size category changes between Table 3 and 4 because the populations 
used for the breaks are different (2010 in Table 3, 2015 in Table 4). The populations of the towns are 
changing over time, causing towns to switch size categories. 
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significant for recipient cities across all size categories in Table 3, but only significant for the > 





















B&I Loans by size of the town 






Median household income (MHI) is another variable in the basic descriptive statistics 
tables. Most of the MHI values for loan recipients are lower than those for nonrecipients, but few 
are statistically significant. However, of the three values that are statistically significant two have 
a lower MHI in recipient places than nonrecipients (Tables 2, 3, and 4). The fact that more 
recipient places had lower MHIs may be due to the application requirements for the B&I 




10 The B&I priority scoresheet awards more points to locations with high poverty levels, which is likely 
correlated with lower MHI.  
B&I Loans by loan amount 




2005 Basic Descriptive Statistics 

























<500 0 0 347 – 215  – $31,957  
500 - 
2,499 
13 10 201 1,479 1,073 0.005*** $29,042 $31,707 0.143 
2,500 - 
9,999 
21 16 74 4,917 4,536 0.245 $34,174 $33,712 0.554 
10,000 - 
49,999 
19 13 21 20,976 20,856 0.487 $34,226 $41,324 0.026** 
>50,000 2 1 6 392,478 159,522  $37,303 $46,009  




689         
* represents statistically different means at 10% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance 
 
Table 3 
 2010 Basic Descriptive Statistics 
























<500 1 1 378 497 209  $45,192 $38,601  
500 - 
2,499 
19 11 210 1,430 1,094 0.018** $39,972 $35,876 0.094* 
2,500 - 
9,999 
21 16 71 5,366 4,559 0.069* $39,342 $38,803 0.550 
10,000 - 
49,999 
13 6 29 26,698 19,019 0.039** $40,221 $44,045 0.246 
>50,000 5 3 5 360,9943 77,315 0.015** $42,765 $54,307 0.0824* 




730         













 2015 Basic Descriptive Statistics 
























<500 0 0 391 – 200  – $41,893  
500 - 
2,499 
16 9 208 1,088 1,103 0.466 $44,354 $42,584 0.337 
2,500 - 
9,999 
25 19 73 5,119 4,562 0.148 $42,058 $44,472 0.288 
10,000 - 
49,999 
9 5 29 22,337 20,185 0.310 $45,186 $49,645 0.267 
>50,000 9 4 5 300,293 81,672 0.053* $49,686 $59,982 0.104 




743         
* represents statistically different means at 10% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance  
 
An important part of this analysis on city tax revenue is the number of local retail 
businesses. Thus, a third data source used in this research is the zip code business pattern data 
(ZCBP), which includes the total number of retail businesses for all zip codes in Oklahoma. This 
data is gathered at the zip code level, which does not match the place-level demographic 
characteristics. This requires an extra step of mapping each zip code to the designated place level 
to keep the data consistent. In order to map the zip codes to the place level, a conversion from the 
Missouri Census Data Center (2016) allocating the percentage of each zip code to the associated 
place level was used. This results in some places being allocated a percentage (non-whole 
numbers) of a retail business rather than a whole number. 
As Tables 5, 6, and 7 show, the average total number of retail business increases as place 
size increases, which is an expected outcome because having more people in a community is 
generally associated with more businesses. The average total number of retail businesses is higher 
for loan recipients than nonrecipients in both 2005 and 2010, and the averages are all statistically 
different at the 5% level (Table 5 and Table 6). In 2015, this same pattern holds true, with all 
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differences at least statistically significant at the 10% level. The noted difference between 
recipient/nonrecipient communities in terms of population, MHI, and number of businesses 
suggest that it will be important to use a technique such as coarsened exact matching to assure the 
estimation of a “true” counterfactual.  
The Oklahoma Tax Commission (OTC) is the source for the total retail sales (TRS) tax 
data. The TRS data used in this research is SIC code based (retail trade are codes 52-59) from 
2005 to 2015, and it is collected at the place level for all retail sectors. The OTC gathers data on 
the amount of tax revenue each place has collected in each time period. Then the tax revenue for 
each place is divided by the place-level sales tax rate to get the TRS expenditures for each place 
(i.e. dollars spent in that town). The TRS data for each place is then divided by the population to 
obtain the TRS per capita data. Tables 5, 6, and 7 show that in 2005, 2010, and 2015, total retail 
sales (TRS) per capita in 2010 real dollars are all higher for loan recipients compared to 
nonrecipients, but not all averages are statistically significant11.   
In this research we are also interested in the change in TRS from 2005 to 2010 and 2010 
to 2015, which is also displayed in Table 5, 6, and 7. The change in TRS for the two time periods 
are all higher for places receiving a loan, except for 10,000 – 49,999 size category in Table 7, but 
not all average changes are statistically higher than those that occurred in nonrecipients cities. 






11 In 2005 and 2015, there is not an average TRS per capita with loans for the <500 place size because the 




2005 Retail Descriptive Statistics  
  
2005 Total number of Retail 
Businesses 
2005 TRS Per Capita (2010$) 
2005-2010 TRS Change  


















<500 0.00 0.92  $0 $4,869  $0 $0.271   
500 - 
2,499 
8.70 5.94 0.007*** $6,592 $5,796 0.180 $1.799 $0.977 0.022** 
2,500 - 
9,999 
34.22 25.60 0.067** $14,021 $9,516 0.002*** $10.532 $8.426 0.294 
10,000 - 
49,999 
131.44 95.59 0.038** $15,743 $13,305 0.050* $41.810 $53.341 0.750 
>50,000 1842.24 636.14   $17,723 $13,388   $445.488 $299.350   
* represents 10% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance  
 
Table 6 
2010 Retail Descriptive Statistics  
  
2010 Total number of 
Retail Businesses 
2010 TRS Per Capita 
2010-2015 TRS Change  


















<500 3.00 0.84   $7,990 $6,509   $7.083 $0.641   
500 - 
2,499 
11.04 5.29 0.000*** $7,711 $5,649 0.034** $4.069 $2,003 0.015** 
2,500 - 
9,999 
33.78 23.43 0.007*** $13,570 $9,771 0.006*** $16.189 $9.679 0.039** 
10,000 - 
49,999 
144.16 90.99 0.015** $15,163 $13,768 0.224 $71.050 $63.586 0.380 
>50,000 1447.08 236.95 0.011** $14,919 $12,378 0.060* $1,320.0 $203.669 0.031** 
* represents 10% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance  
 
Table 7 
2015 Retail Descriptive Statistics  
 2015 Total number of 
Retail Businesses 
2015 TRS Per Capita 
2010-2015 TRS Change  


















<500 0 1.02   $10,424  $0 $0.660   
500 - 
2,499 
7.500 5.115 0.040** $10,690 $6,682 0.008*** $4.604 $1.987 0.007*** 
2,500 - 
9,999 
31.058 22.038 0.009*** $14,255 $10,734 0.017** $14.070 $9.636 0.096 * 
10,000 - 
49,999 
128.661 91.525 0.073* $16,151 $15,100 0.372 $41.300 $63.586 0.166 
>50,000 1184.09 259.901 0.038** $16,072 $13,105 0.037** $1,050.0 $203.669 0.061 * 
* represents 10% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance  
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Figure 3 shows the average TRS per capita from 2005 to 2015 for places in all five of the 
size categories, regardless of whether they received a B&I loan. The TRS per capita for all size 
categories follows a general trend of increasing from 2005 to 2015. However, the change from 
2009 to 2010 was a decrease for nearly all sizes, which is expected due to the Great Recession. 
Further investigating the TRS impacts of B&I loans, Figure 4 shows the TRS per capita of loan 
recipient communities five year prior to and five year after receiving a loan guarantee during time 
period one. Some cities appear to experience an increase in TRS per capita after receiving a B&I 
loan, while others do not. The results in Figure 4 suggests that a more rigorous analysis is needed 
to further investigate the true impact of the B&I program has on TRS and TRS per capita of 


























TRS per capita in real 2010 dollars





This research focuses on places in Oklahoma with populations greater than or equal to 
500 people and less than 50,000 people.12 One reason the minimum population size is limited to 
500 is because of the large difference between total observations and observations with TRS data. 
In 2005 there were 347 total census observations with <500, but only 186 places had TRS data. 
Similarly, in 2010 there were 378 total census observation with only 188 places recording TRS 
data – likely because many lacked a sales-tax collecting business. Therefore, limiting the data to 
places with only 500 people or more will help deal with this data inconsistency. Further, as Table 
3, 4, and 5 show, only one town with less than 500 people received a B&I loan during 2005-2015. 
 
12 A business usually cannot receive a B&I loan guarantee if located in a place with a population of 50,000 
or more people. However, the location of the loan can be deemed eligible by the USDA eligibility map, 




































































TRS per capita for Oklahoma places 5 years before and after 




The remaining size categories are relatively consistent with the number of observations reporting 
TRS and total observations and only a few places switch size categories (i.e. moving to a higher 
or lower population grouping) across the years of analysis. 
METHODS 
The main challenge with this research is estimating the counterfactual – i.e. the tax revenue a city 
with a B&I recipient would have earned if that business did not receive a B&I loan. This is a 
similar issue that Rupasingha, Crown and Pender (2018) faced in their analysis of the B&I 
program. For example, if a business needed a loan guarantee but it did not receive one, there may 
have been negative repercussions to that business that impacted local retail sales (for example, 
going out of business or losing employees). Data on this alternative reality does not exist, so I 
utilize econometric techniques to try and answer the research question at hand. First, simple linear 
regression is used to get preliminary results that estimate the impact of a loan on tax collections 
over a specific period before running a first-differenced linear regression model that focuses on 
changes over time. Next, coarsened exact matching is used to prune the dataset and ensure better 
matches between the treated and control groups. Finally, the last step is to rerun the chosen 
regression models with the pruned dataset.  
Simple Linear Regression 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is the first econometric technique used in this research to 
analyze the data. The OLS regression equation used is: 
(1) 𝑌 = 𝑋  𝛽 + 𝐿 𝛾 + 𝜖 
where 𝑌  is the TRS (and TRS per capita) in time period t, 𝑋  are the control variables 
(population, median household income, number of retail businesses, percent black, percent with a 
bachelor’s degree, percent of population with income below poverty, and local tax rate), 
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𝐿  represents total loan amount for each place made over the prior period 2005-2009 (or 2010-
2015), and 𝜖 is the error term of the model, for all time t. 𝛾 is the parameter of focus in this 
research, with a positive and significant 𝛾 implying that the loans are having an impact.  
First-differenced Linear Regression 
The second step of the analysis is to use a first-differenced specification of the OLS regression 
because I am also interested in explaining the changes in retail sales between years. The first-
differenced OLS regression equation used in this research is:  
(2)    Δ𝑌 = Δ𝑋  𝛽 + Δ𝐿 𝛾 + 𝜖  
where Δ𝑌  is the change of TRS (or TRS per capita) in time period t, t is either 2005-2010 or 
2010-2015, Δ𝑋  are the changes in control variables (ΔMHI, Δ poverty, Δ population, Δ # of 
businesses, etc.) in time period t, Δ𝐿  is the change in loan variable, only if the loan takes place in 
time period t, and 𝜖 is the error term.  
A place receiving a loan guarantee may not see an impact on TRS the first year the loan guarantee 
is issued. Therefore, this research is going to analyze the change of TRS from 2005 to 2010 and 
2010 to 2015 by looking at cumulative loans granted during the two periods of analysis. The 
analysis is most interested in the estimate of γ – i.e. whether the loans had a statistical impact on 
changes in total retail sales.  
Coarsened Exact Matching 
In order to overcome the identification challenge (matching of the treated and control groups), 
Rupasingha, Crown and Pender (2018) constructed counterfactuals using the outcome of 
untreated businesses, which is also the approach used in this research. Creating counterfactuals 
helps determine what would have happened to the places’ TRS if a business had not received a 
loan guarantee. While the regression-based approaches above use all observations, the differences 
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between treated and control groups for variables like the number of businesses and/or population 
(Tables 2-7) may be problematic. 
To account for these differences, Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) is utilized to reduce 
the dataset into control and treated groups that are more similarly matched. CEM is a relatively 
new econometric technique, with one of the first demonstrations coming from Blackwell et al. 
(2009). CEM is used for estimating causal effects when covariates have differences between 
treated and control groups (Blackwell et al., 2009). The control group is the counterfactual of the 
dataset. Other techniques, such as propensity score matching (PSM), have tried to address this. 
However, Iacus, King and Porro (2011) explain that PSM and other matching methods called 
“Equal Percent Bias Reducing” (EPBR) are only designed to satisfy weaker properties because 
most of the time the three main assumptions of EPBR are not satisfied in observational data13. 
EPBR methods only improves for the mean imbalance (main effects) of the variables in the 
dataset, but does not guarantee any level of imbalance reduction of the data by making 
assumptions that are normally unverifiable about the data set (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2011; 
Iacus, King and Porro 2012). 
CEM is a “Monotonic Imbalance Bounding” matching method that requires fewer to no 
assumptions than EPBR matching methods, and it is easier to use and understand (Blackwell et 
al., 2009 and Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012). The basic idea of CEM is to ‘coarsen’ each variable 
into strata of treated and control groups that only have the same identifiable values; thus 
restricting the dataset only to treated and control groups that are similar in their underlying 
characteristics (Blackwell et al., 2009 and Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012). This approach likely 
reduces bias. Furthermore, CEM bounds the degree of model dependence and causal estimation 
 
13 The three main assumptions of EPBR are: “X (a k-dimensional data set) is drawn randomly from a 
specified population X, the population distribution of X is an ellipsoidally symmetric density or a 
discriminant mixture of proportionally ellipsoidally symmetric densities, and the matching algorithm 
applied is invariant to affine transformations of X” (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012) 
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error by ex-ante user choice, does not require extra steps to prune the data, and meets the 
congruence principle (Blackwell, 2009)14.  
The data is coarsened on certain demographic characteristics likely to influence TRS 
(population, MHI, percent population is black, percent with a bachelor’s degree, percent of 
population with income below poverty, and local tax rate). Once the dataset is pruned, the same 
regressions discussed earlier will be used.  
Robustness Check 
Since CEM is a relatively new methodology, Propensity Score Matching (PSM) is also used to 
ensure the results are robust. PSM is similar to CEM, where a counterfactual of the untreated 
group is constructed, but PSM’s method of constructing the counterfactual is different than 
CEM’s approach. PSM uses a logistic regression to estimate the likelihood of a community being 
treated (in this case, a place receiving a B&I loan or not) (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Whitacre, 
Shideler, and Williams, 2016). This is different than CEM’s approach of creating “bins” of 
identifiable values, and then matching control and treated groups with similar bin structures. The 
PSM approach results in a propensity score reflecting the likelihood of a community receiving a 
loan guarantee; each community is put in treated and control groups based on whether or not they 
actually received a loan. Once the propensity scores are estimated, alternative matching methods 
are used to match control communities with otherwise similar treated communities (i.e. with 
similar propensity scores). In this research, five different matching methods (nearest neighbor, 
kernel default, kernel normal, kernel biweight, and radius caliper 0.01) are used to compare to the 
results of the CEM methodology. The nearest neighbor approach matches the treated group with 
the nearest neighbor(s) (i.e. the five closest matches to each propensity score) within the control 
 
14 “The congruence principle states that the data space and analysis state should be the same,” and if the 
method does not meet this standard the results are often strange and/or counterintuitive (Blackwell, 2009). 
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group, with or without replacement (Caliendo and Katrishen, 1994). The nearest neighbor 
approach in this research matches the nearest five neighbors with replacement. Matching with 
replacement reduces the bias and increases the average quality of the matches (Caliendo and 
Katrishen, 1994). Kernel matching is a nonparametric matching estimator that uses weighted 
averages of the control group to construct the counterfactual to match to treated communities 
(Caliendo and Katrishen, 1994). As such, all control group observations are used, but those with 
closer propensity scores are given more weight. The three different types of kernel functions used 
in this research to construct the counterfactuals are the default (Epanechnikov), biweight, and the 
normal (Gaussian) kernel. The radius caliper matching is similar to nearest neighbor except that it 
matches all available controls to within the distance of the caliper (Caliendo and Katrishen, 
1994). The caliper distance in this research is 0.01. Again, PSM is not the main methodology 








The results of the simple OLS and first-differenced regression models with and without the CEM 
specification for the two different time periods of interest are presented in Table 8, 9, 10, and 11. 
Table 8 analyzes the impact on 2010 TRS for places in Oklahoma receiving a loan during time 
period one (2005-2009), whereas table 10 focuses on 2015 TRS and loans received in time period 
two (2010-2014). Table 9 and 11 perform similar regressions, but changes the dependent variable 
to TRS per capita. The results of the regression models show mixed results for the impact that 
B&I loans have on TRS and TRS per capita, but demonstrate stronger impacts in the earlier 
(2005-2010) period. 
 The first two sets of columns in Table 8 use equation 1 to estimate the TRS. The simple 
OLS column uses the unpruned data whereas the simple OLS with CEM weights columns use the 
pruned data. The L1 imbalance measure demonstrates that CEM is reducing the amount of 
imbalance in the data. After controlling for demographic characteristics in 2010, both simple OLS 
models find that the loan amount variable is significant. In the simple OLS without CEM weights 
the loan variable is significant at the five percent level, and it is significant at the one percent 
level with the CEM weights, when the dependent variable is TRS 2010 (Table 8). Furthermore, in 
the first-differenced models (third and fourth set of columns) the loan amount variable is 
statistically significant at the one percent level without CEM weights, and at the five percent 
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significance level with the CEM specification (Table 8). Interpreting the loan amount coefficient 
of the simple OLS with CEM weights on the 2010 TRS suggests that a one percent increase in 
loan amount would result in 0.0233% higher TRS collected. As expected, the R-squared values 
are smaller for the first-differenced models than they are for the basic OLS models. Additionally, 
the R-squared values increases slightly in the OLS with CEM weights and drastically increases in 
the first-differenced model with the CEM-pruned specification. This suggests that using CEM 
results in a more balanced dataset, as expected. The L1 statistic is the measure of imbalance of the 
data. The L1 statistic for the whole dataset is only reduced from 0.9963 to 0.9020 (Table 8). Even 
though the L1 statistic for the whole dataset is only slightly reduced, the L1 statistic for each 
individual variable is reduced, which lowers the imbalance of the variables (Appendix J). 
However, the one negative of the CEM specification is that it drastically reduces the number of 
observations in the data set in the regression models (for example, going from 307 to 67 in the 
basic OLS models in Table 8). 
Other variables generally show their expected signs, suggesting that the model is 
behaving according to economic theory. One variable hypothesized to have a significant impact 
on TRS is the number of retail businesses. As expected, the number of retail businesses variable 
is significant at least at the five percent level in both simple OLS models, and in both first-
difference models it is at the one percent significance level (Table 8). However, the interpretation 
of the retail businesses coefficient differs between the OLS and first-differenced models. In the 
simple OLS model with the CEM specification when the number of retail businesses increases by 
one, TRS would increase by 0.0095%. However, in the first-differenced CEM model TRS would 
decrease by 0.1348% when the number of businesses increases by one (Table 8). The hypothesis 
for this negative impact on TRS is that the poorly run businesses are going out of business over 
time, leaving only more efficient stores. 
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A third variable hypothesized to have an influence on TRS is the percent of population 
with a bachelor’s degree or higher. In time period one when TRS is the dependent variable, the 
bachelor’s degree coefficient is positive and significant at the five percent level in both basic OLS 
models. However, when the first-differenced models are used, the education variable is not 
significant in either (Table 8).  
Table 8 
        




Basic OLS with CEM 
weights 
first difference OLS 




307 67 262 61 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Log of 2010 
population 






























in 2005 – 
2009  
0.0185 0.010** 0.0233 0.000*** 0.0975 0.000*** 0.0671 0.013** 
Rate 2010 21.4616 0.000*** ‐38.9517 0.000*** -35.0834 0.157 5.1941 0.933 
constant 10.1085 0.000*** -1.9024 0.523 14.0816 0.000*** 14.3525 0.000*** 
R-Squared 0.8747  0.9677  0.2116  0.4296  
L1  0.9963   0.9020   0.9963   0.9020   
Note: * indicates the following *** = p<.01, ** = p<.05, * p=<.1 




Table 9 applies the same independent variables and focuses on the same time period as 
Table 8, but the dependent variable is changed to TRS per capita. The results in Table 9 are 
similar to those in Table 8. Both simple OLS models demonstrate that the amount of loan 
received is positive and significant at the five percent level, but in the first-differenced models 
only the CEM specified model is significant, at the five percent level (Table 9). The interpretation 
of the loan variable in the first-differenced with CEM specification is that a one percent increase 
in loan amount would increase the TRS per capita by 0.0048% (Table 9). Additionally, the R-
Squared value increases drastically in both models when the CEM pruned dataset is used. 
Focusing on the number of retail businesses variable when TRS per capita is the 
dependent variable, it is significant at the five percent level in both simple OLS models, but not 
significant in either first-differenced models (Table 9). Switching focus to the percent of the 
population with a bachelor’s degree, the results of the education variable are similar to the 
number of retail businesses. Both simple OLS models are significant at the five percent level, and 











Table 9         
Pre and post CEM regression with Log of TRS per capita 2010 as dependent 
variable, 2010 control variables 
 
Basic OLS 
Basic OLS with CEM 
weights 
first difference OLS 




307 67 303 67 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Log of 2010 
population 






























in 2005 – 
2009  
0.0185 0.010** 0.0233 0.000*** 0.0013 0.588 0.0048 0.035** 
Rate 2010 21.4616 0.000*** -38.9517 0.000*** 0.0041 0.999 -6.3353 0.202 
constant 10.1085 0.000*** -1.9024 0.523 0.1246 0.000*** 0.1308 0.004*** 
R-Squared 0.3860  0.7299  0.0161  0.2452  
L1  0.9963   0.9020   0.9963   0.9020   
Note: * indicates the following *** = p<.01, ** = p<.05, * p=<.1 




This research also analyzed the impact of TRS (2010) for a place receiving a loan when 
the previous time period demographic characteristics (2005) were used to coarsen the dataset and 
run the regression models. The basic idea is to be able to “predict” later TRS using earlier period 
characteristics. The same approaches and techniques used above in the “same year” (2010 TRS 
and 2010 demographic characteristics) regression models are applied here in the “different year” 
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regression models. The results in time period one of the “different year” regression models are 
similar to the “same year” regression models. The loan variable is statistically significant at least 
at the five percent level in all four models when 2010 TRS is the dependent variable (Appendix 
A). In the “same year” regression models, the loan variable was significant in all four models 
(Table 8). Switching the dependent variable to 2010 TRS per capita, only the basic OLS models 
are significant (Appendix B) in the “different year” regression models. This is different than the 
“same year” regression models where both the basic OLS models and the first-differenced with 
the CEM specification is significant (Table 9).  
The results for the “same year” regression models in time period one shows that the main 
variable of interest, the log of the amount of loan received variable, is significant in seven of the 
eight models (Table 8 and 9), while only being significant in six of the eight “different year” 
models (Appendix A and B). These results support the hypothesis that places receiving loans see 
their TRS expenditures increase.  
The second time period regression coefficients and p-values are depicted in Tables 10 
and 11. All of the independent variables used in period two are the same as in time period one 
except the 2015 values are used instead of 2010. Here, the loans are those made during 2010-
2014. However, the regression results in time period two are quite different than in time period 
one. The OLS and first-difference models without the CEM specification both display significant 
loan coefficients at the five percent level when TRS is the dependent variable. However, neither 
coefficient is significant when the pruned dataset is used (Table 10). The results of the total 
number of retail businesses and the percent of the population with a bachelor’s degree or higher 
differ from the loan variable. The number of retail businesses variable is significant at the one 
percent level in both OLS models. However, the education level variable is significant at the five 
percent level in the basic OLS without the CEM specification, and it significant at the ten percent 
level in the first-differenced with the CEM specification.  
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Table 10         




Basic OLS with 
CEM weights 
first difference OLS 




304 42 269 36 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Log of 2015 
population 
































2010 - 2014 
0.0208 0.015** 0.0188 0.132 0.0549 0.01** 0.0194 0.590 
Rate 2015 30.0396 0.000*** 23.5749 0.175 -56.4361 0.07* 186.1157 0.007 
constant 11.6638 0.000*** 16.6354 0.109 15.1294 0.000*** 14.6841 0.000 
R-Squared 0.8394  0.9240  0.0784  0.5680  
L1  0.9853   0.9264   0.9853   0.9264   
Note: * indicates the following *** = p<.01, ** = p<.05, * p=<.1 
L1 is the measure of imbalance of covariates between treatment and control groups (smaller L1 implies better 
balance) 
 
Furthermore, when the dependent variable of the models are changed to TRS per capita, 
the simple OLS without the CEM weights is the only model where the loan variable is statistically 
significant (Table 11). The number of retail businesses variable is significant at the one percent 
level in both OLS model, but not significant in either first-difference models. The education level 
variable is statistically significant only in the basic OLS without the CEM specification as well. 
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Again, the R-squared values increases when the CEM specification is used. The L1 statistic only 
reduces from 0.9853 to 0.9264 for the whole dataset (Table 11), but the L1 statistic for almost all 
variables is reduced after the pruning, which reduces the imbalance of dataset (Appendix K). 
 
Table 11         
Pre and post CEM regression with Log of TRS per capita 2015 as dependent 
variable, 2015 control variables 
 
Basic OLS 
Basic OLS with 
CEM weights 
first difference OLS 




304 42 302 40 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Log of 2015 
population 
































2010 - 2014 
0.0208 0.015** 0.0188 0.132 0.0021 0.483 0.0064 0.192 
Rate 2015 30.0396 0.000*** 23.5749 0.175 -3.9119 0.354 -5.2068 0.548 
constant 11.6638 0.000 ** 16.6354 0.109 0.2238 0.000*** 0.1596 0.001*** 
R-Squared 0.3619  0.7411  0.1206  0.3359  
L1  0.9853   0.9264   0.9853   0.9264   
Note: * indicates the following *** = p<.01, ** = p<.05, * p=<.1 





In order to check the robustness of the second time period results, the demographic 
characteristics were changed to the previous time period (2010) instead of the same time period 
(2015). Again, the same techniques and approaches used above in the “same year” regression 
models are used here in the “different year” regression models. The results of the “different year” 
regression models for time period two are shown in Appendices C and D. These results are very 
similar to the “same year” regression models that are in Tables 10 and 11, lending confidence that 
the results are robust. The loan variable is significant in both the basic OLS and first-differenced 
models without the CEM specification, and significant in the basic OLS with the CEM 
specification when the dependent variable is TRS (Appendix C). Switching to TRS per capita as 
the dependent variable, the loan variable is statistically significant only in the basic OLS models 
(Appendix D).  
The results for time period two shows that the main variable of interest, the log of the 
amount of loan received variable, is significant in three of the eight models in the “same year” 
models, and it is significant in five of the eight “different year” models (Table 10, and 11, and 
Appendices C and D). Notably, none of the CEM-reduced specifications show any significance of 
the loan variable in the “same year” models. These results do not support the hypothesis – that 
B&I loan recipients have higher TRS – as much as the results in time period one. 
PSM was also used to check the robustness of the CEM results. The logit models 
underlying the PSM approach are detailed in Appendix G (2005-2010) and Appendix H (2010-
2015). They generally behave as expected, with positive and significant results for total retail 
businesses in period one (Appendix G), and positive and significant results for total retail 
businesses and the log of median household income in period two (Appendix H). The p-values of 
the five different PSM methods used and whether these p-values support or contradict the CEM 
p-values are displayed in Tables 12 and 13. The “S” and “C” in Tables 12 and 13 denote whether 
the PSM results support (S) the results of the CEM models or that they contradict (C) the CEM 
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results15. The PSM results in Table 12 are uniform for all matching methods. The five PSM 
methods support the CEM results for three of the four dependent variables, and only contradicts 
when the dependent variable is the differenced TRS per capita from 2005 to 2010 (Table 12). 
Here, the PSM suggests no statistical difference between the treated and control groups, but the 
CEM results (Table 8) suggests otherwise – but only at the 10 percent level. Thus the PSM results 
largely match those for CEM in the first time period of analysis.  
Table 12            
Pseudo 
R2 0.1518          
 































0.056 S 0.020 S 0.008 S 0.028 S 0.016 S 
TRS per 
cap 2010 








0.556 C 0.290 C 0.407 C 0.281 C 0.100 C 
CEM rejects the null of no B&I impact in time period 1 
S – supports the CEM findings for time period 1 
C – contradicts the CEM findings for time period 1 
 
The PSM results vary for time period two (Table 13). The nearest neighbor, kernel 
default, and kernel biweight matching methods only supports the “same year” regressions with 
the CEM specification when the dependent variables are the differenced 2015 TRS and 
differenced 2015 TRS per capita (Table 13). This shows that PSM rejected the null of no 
differences across treated/control groups more often than the CEM specification for this period. 
 




The kernel normal specification only supports the CEM results when TRS per capita is the 
dependent variable. However, the radius caliper (0.01) supports the CEM results for three of the 
four dependent variables. Radius matching only contradicts when TRS per capita 2015 is the 
dependent variable. Overall, the results of the PSM approach mostly supports the CEM specified 
“different year” regression models for both time periods, but are more contradictory in time 
period 2.  
Table 13            
Pseudo 
R2 0.1066          
 































0.083 C 0.057 C 0.003 C 0.079 C 0.181 S 
TRS per 
cap 2015 








0.764 S 0.960 S 0.712 S 0.984 S 0.639 S 
CEM fails to reject the null of no B&I impact in time period 2 
S – supports the CEM findings for time period 2 
C – contradicts the CEM findings for time period 2 
  
Regression models for the entire time period (2015 TRS and TRS per capita as the 
dependent variables with 2005 control variables and the natural log of loan amounts for places 
between 2005 and 2014) are depicted in Appendices E and F. The loan variable is statistically 
significant, at the five percent level or lower, in seven of the eight models for the entire time 
period. These results are similar results to the “same year” models that had seven of the eight 
regression models showing significance of the loan variable (Tables 8 and 9). However, one issue 
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with running regression models over the whole time period (2005-2015) is that it masks the 
differing impacts over the years.  
The results from the regression models depict mixed results of the impact that the B&I 
program has on TRS and TRS per capita in Oklahoma. This could be a result of multiple external 
factors affecting TRS in Oklahoma communities. During time period one, the Great Recession 
was taking place in the United States, affecting Oklahoma’s (and other state’s) economy. As 
previously mentioned, some of the impact of the Great Recession can be seen with the decrease in 
TRS per capita for most size categories from 2009 to 2010 (Figure 3). However, during period 
one the regression coefficient for the loan amount variable was statistically significant across all 
but one model specification, which suggests that the B&I program and other similar 
governmental programs may be important to fund during tough economic times. During time 
period two the results show little to no significant impact of the B&I loans, which could be a 
result of external factors that are not accounted for in the models. For example, one important 
industry in the Oklahoma economy is the oil and gas industry, which saw a major boom during 











The goal of this research is to evaluate the impact of the B&I loan guarantee program on TRS for 
Oklahoma communities in two distinct time periods. It is important to note that the dependent 
variable (TRS) is only one possible outcome measure for the B&I program. In fact, it is not even 
listed in the goals of RDs mission and purpose statement, and as such this evaluation is only a 
partial component of what the impacts of the B&I program could be. Furthermore, this research 
aimed to fill a gap in the tax revenue literature by using tax revenue as the dependent variable in 
the analysis. 
In the analysis, the demographic characteristics are controlled for in the OLS models, and 
then coarsened/pruned in the dataset in order to better match the treated and control groups. 
Mixed evidence was found in support of the B&I loan guarantee program in the analysis. The key 
variable, the log of the loan amount a place received, was positively and statistically significant in 
all but one model specification for time period one (2005-2010), but it was only significant in the 
second time period (2010-2015) for three model specifications. None of the more robust CEM 
models found a statistically significant impact of loans in this later time period. One takeaway 
from this research is the dramatic differences in results between periods of economic downturn 
(2005-2010) versus a more robust economy (2010-2015). This shows that funding the B&I loan 
guarantee and other similar programs may be more vital during tough economic times when
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tax revenue is at risk for rural communities. 
These findings should be interpreted with caution because of the limitations in the study 
and data. One of the limitations of the data is we do not know if all loans were successful or if 
some loans went into default. If the loans did go into default, it could negatively impact the TRS 
and TRS per capita of a community because a business is likely closing. The CEM methodology 
used in this analysis is a powerful tool, and it works best when the imbalance of the dataset is 
reduced after pruning the data. The robustness checks generally support the findings from the 
CEM methodology. The two time periods see only a slight reduction of the imbalance of the 
whole dataset for both time periods, but the individual variables imbalance is reducedSecondly, 
the number of towns in the pruned dataset is a relatively small dataset, which could also impact 
the regression model with the CEM weights. Finally, this data is specific to Oklahoma and may 
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Basic OLS with 
CEM weights 
first difference OLS 




301 57 262 57 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Log of 2005 
population 
































2005 – 2009  
0.0168 0.015** 0.0214 0.003*** 0.0975 0.000*** 0.0775 0.014** 
Rate 2005 19.4154 0.000*** 1.7748 0.889 -35.0834 0.157 -77.2299 0.187 
constant 10.7196 0.000*** 10.5309 0.062* 14.0816 0.000*** 14.0224 0.000*** 
R-Squared 0.8836  0.9375  0.2116  0.4132  
L1  0.9962  0.7563   0.9962  0.7563   
Note: * indicates the following *** = p<.01, ** = p<.05, * p=<.1 





         
Pre and post CEM regression with Log of TRS per capita 2010 as dependent 
variable, 2005 control variables 
 
Basic OLS 
Basic OLS with 
CEM weights 
first difference OLS 




301 57 303 57 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Log of 2005 
population 





-0.6008 0.017** -0.3509 0.471 0.2004 0.278 0.3547 0.316 
Total retail 
business 2005 





















in 2005 – 
2009  
0.0172 0.012** 0.0213 0.002*** 0.0013 0.588 0.0022 0.487 
Rate 2005 20.4660 0.000*** 3.9846 0.742 0.0041 0.999 -2.5057 0.678 
constant 12.3137 0.000*** 11.6196 0.032** 0.1246 0.000*** 0.0906 0.078* 
R-Squared 0.4050  0.6630  0.0161  0.1136  
L1  0.9962  0.7563   0.9962  0.7563   
Note: * indicates the following *** = p<.01, ** = p<.05, * p=<.1 








         




Basic OLS with 
CEM weights 
first difference OLS 




306 49 269 46 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Log of 2010 
population 
































2010 - 2014 
0.0172 0.035** 0.0245 0.022** 0.0549 0.010** 0.0007 0.984 
Rate 2010 26.2925 0.000*** 14.3020 0.367 -56.4361 0.070 21.0293 0.798 
constant 8.8539 0.000*** 5.2044 0.296 15.1294 0.000*** 15.0274 0.000*** 
R-Squared 0.8517  0.9149  0.0784  0.2263  
L1  0.9927   0.8926   0.9927   0.8926   
Note: * indicates the following *** = p<.01, ** = p<.05, * p=<.1 
L1 is the measure of imbalance of covariates between treatment and control groups (smaller L1 







         
Pre and post CEM regression with Log of TRS per capita 2015 as dependent 
variable, 2010 control variables 
 
Basic OLS 
Basic OLS with CEM 
weights 
first difference OLS 




306 49 302 49 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Log of 2010 
population 





-0.3167 0.122 0.3047 0.525 -0.0100 0.899 -0.0178 0.924 
Total retail 
business 2010 





















in 2010 - 
2014 
0.0161 0.049** 0.0209 0.054* 0.0021 0.483 0.0008 0.859 
Rate 2010 26.5085 0.000*** 12.8037 0.430 -3.9119 0.354 12.9068 0.260 
constant 10.1415 0.000*** 5.9418 0.245 0.2238 0.000*** 0.2858 0.000*** 
R-Squared 0.4050  0.5213  0.1206  0.3595  
L1  0.9927   0.8926   0.9927   0.8926   
Note: * indicates the following *** = p<.01, ** = p<.05, * p=<.1 
L1 is the measure of imbalance of covariates between treatment and control groups (smaller L1 







         




Basic OLS with CEM 
weights 
first difference OLS 




300 83 278 75 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Log of 2005 
population 





-0.2935 0.291 -0.4644 0.330 ‐0.1580 0.807 0.0578 0.958 
Total retail 
business 2005 





















in 2005 – 
2014 
0.0222 0.001*** 0.0260 0.001*** 0.0990 0.000*** 0.0513 0.018** 
Rate 2005 23.3443 0.000*** 6.9448 0.563 ‐8.6918 0.620 47.1363 0.090* 
constant 9.7779 0.001*** 13.1910 0.012** 15.1737 0.000*** 14.9775 0.000*** 
R-Squared 0.8612  0.8862  0.2169  0.3093  
L1  0.9919   0.8653   0.9919   0.8653   
Note: * indicates the following *** = p<.01, ** = p<.05, * p=<.1 









         
Pre and post CEM regression with Log of TRS per capita 2015 as dependent 
variable, 2005 control variables 
 
Basic OLS 
Basic OLS with CEM 
weights 
first difference OLS 




300 83 299 82 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Log of 2005 
population 





‐0.6127 0.027** -0.6491 0.177 0.1607 0.154 0.2484 0.223 
Total retail 
business 2005 





















in 2005 – 
2014 
0.0208 0.001*** 0.0227 0.003*** 0.0029 0.287 0.0110 0.008*** 
Rate 2005 24.6529 0.000*** 8.6185 0.475 3.6123 0.245 12.4956 0.019** 
constant 13.2497 0.000*** 15.4027 0.004*** 0.3049 0.000*** 0.1672 0.028** 
R-Squared 0.3410  0.4891  0.0543  0.1448  
L1  0.9919   0.8653   0.9919   0.8653  
Note: * indicates the following *** = p<.01, ** = p<.05, * p=<.1 








Logistic regression results for time period one (2005-2010) 




 Number of obs = 301 
    LR chi2(6) = 35.24 
    
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood =  ‐98.435431 
 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1518 
rec~20052009 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
pop_2005 ‐.0001704 0.0000815 ‐2.09 0.037 ‐.0003301 ‐.0000107 
ln_MHI_2005 1.876499 1.485427 1.26 0.206 ‐1.034885 4.787883 
Tot_Bus_2005 0.0489083 0.0146132 3.35 0.001 0.0202671 0.0775496 
pct_bac~2005 ‐4.28565 5.23159 ‐0.82 0.413 ‐14.53938 5.968078 
pct_inc~2005 4.705972 4.437336 1.06 0.289 ‐3.991047 13.40299 
Rate_2005 7.093151 33.15147 0.21 0.831 ‐57.88253 72.06883 
_cons ‐22.72588 15.83885 ‐1.43 0.151 ‐53.76947 8.3177 
Note: the common support option has been selected 
The region of common support is [.04937083, .95023095] 




Population 2005 was used instead of the natural log of 2005 population because the balancing 










Logistic regression results for time period two (2010-2015) 




 Number of obs = 307 
    LR chi2(6) = 21.88 
    
Prob > chi2 = 0.0013 
Log likelihood =  ‐91.685074 
 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1066 
rec~20102015 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
pop_2010 ‐.0001395 0.0000762 ‐1.83 0.067 ‐.0002888 9.91e‐06 
ln_MHI_2010 2.114062 1.125521 1.88 0.060 ‐.0919188 4.320042 
Tot_Bus_2010 0.0395799 0.014109 2.81 0.005 0.0119267 0.067233 
pct_bac~2010 ‐4.441529 4.394282 ‐1.01 0.312 ‐13.05416 4.171106 
pct_inc~2010 3.522476 3.262726 1.08 0.280 ‐2.872351 9.917302 
Rate_2010 48.14733 35.22121 1.37 0.172 ‐20.88497 117.1796 
_cons ‐26.67018 12.11538 ‐2.20 0.028 ‐50.41589 ‐2.924468 
Note: the common support option has been selected 
The region of common support is [.04651842, .64295208] 
Description of the estimated propensity score in region of common support 
 
Note* 
Population 2010 was used instead of the natural log of 2010 population because the balancing 













USDA Rural Business-Cooperative Service Programs Enacted Budget Level of 
Funding  
(in millions of dollars) 
Item 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Appropriate Tech. Transfer to Rural 
Areas 
$2 $2 $2 $2 $2 $3 $3 
Bioenergy for Advanced Biofuels $65 - $15 $14 $15 $14 $14 
Biorefinery Assistance Guaranteed 
Loans 
$0 - $241 $71 $208 - - 
Business and Industry Guaranteed 
Loans 
$811 $890 $958 $920 $920 $922 $920 
Intermediary Relending Program $18 $18 $19 $19 $19 $19 $19 
Rural Business Development Grants $26 $25 $27 $24 $24 $24 $34 
Rural Cooperative Development 
Grants 
$9 $6 $6 $6 $6 $6 $6 
Rural Economic Development: Loans 
and Grants 
$43 $43 $43 $43 $45 $52 $55 
Rural Energy for America (Sec. 
9007) Loans and Grants 
$61 $13 $129 $88 $200 $342 $342 
Rural Microentrepreneur Assistance 
Program (sec. 6022): Loans and 
Grants 
- $0 $33 $8 $8 $8 $8 
Small Socially Disadvantaged 
Producer Grants 
- $3 $3 $3 $3 $3 $3 
Value-Added Producer Grants $14 $14 $15 $11 $11 $15 $16 
a/ - subject to reauthorization        
These are all proposed budget amounts and not the estimated or enacted amounts 











Univariate imbalance before and after CEM for 2010 same year models (2010 TRS and control 
variables) 
 Before CEM CEM specification     
   0 1    
 
 
All 301 39 
   
 
 
Matched 48 19 
   
 
 
Unmatched 253 20 
   
Multivariate L1 distance:  0.9963 
 
0.9020  




   
 
L1  L1     
pop_2010 0.40078  0.2105     
ln_MHI_2010 0.27057  0.2363     
Tot_Bus_2010 0.41715  0.0322     
pct_bach_2010 0.18819  0.1605     
pct_income below 
poverty_2010 
0.18398  0.1301     
















Univariate imbalance before and after CEM for 2015 same year models (2010 TRS and control 
variables) 
 Before CEM CEM specification     
   0 1    
 
 
All 310 33 
   
 
 
Matched 34 11 
   
 
 
Unmatched 276 22 
   
Multivariate L1 distance:  0.9853 
 
0.9264  




   
 
L1  L1     
pop_2015 0.31066  0.23972     
ln_MHI_2015 0.21507  0.04545     
Tot_Bus_2015 0.35294  0.36201     
pct_bach_2015 0.25551  0.19426     
pct_income below 
poverty_2015 0.15625  0.10606 
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